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Background: Male life expectancy in the Russian Federation, at 60 years, is the lowest in Europe. Several
factors contribute to this situation, but hazardous consumption of alcohol is especially a key factor.
Methods: We undertook a stakeholder analysis in a typical Russian region located on the western side
of the Urals. Organizations with a stake in alcohol policy in the region were identified by snowball
sampling and information on their position and influence on alcohol policy was elicited from interviews
with key informants. Their interests and influence were mapped and their relationships plotted.
Results: Twenty-nine stakeholder organizations were identified and 43 interviews were conducted
with their staff. The most influential actors were the Federal and regional governments, large beer
producers and manufacturers of strong alcohols. However, the majority of organizations that might be
expected to play a role in developing or implementing alcohol control policies were almost entirely
disengaged and fragmented. No evidence was found of an existing or emerging multi-sectoral coalition
for developing alcohol policy to improve health. Organizations that might be expected to contribute to
tackling hazardous drinking had little understanding of what might be effective. Conclusions: While
stakeholders with an interest in maintaining or increasing alcohol consumption are engaged and influ-
ential, those who might seek to reduce it either take a very narrow perspective or are disengaged from
the policy agenda. There is a need to mobilize actors who might contribute to effective policies while
challenging those who can block them.
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Introduction
H
azardous consumption of alcohol is a major factor in the
high rate of premature death in Russia,
1,2 with non-
beverage alcohols (containing 70–95% ethanol) such as
medicinal tinctures and aftershaves,
3 consumed by about 8%
of working age men,
4 especially dangerous.
5 In January 2006
the federal government introduced controls on manufacture
and sales of these products,
6 which coincided with a fall in
alcohol-related mortality. However, in 2007 many products,
especially medicinal tinctures, remained easily available.
7
Moreover, vodka remains cheap and easily available (including
bootleg vodka), while beer consumption is gaining popularity
among young people.
Russia is, however, a federation, and actions are also
required at regional level. In this paper, we explore the
context of policy making on alcohol in a typical Russian
‘oblast’ (region).
Methods
During 2007–08 we undertook a stakeholder analysis in an
oblast of 1.5 million inhabitants located close to the Urals.
Stakeholder analysis
8 encompasses a range of techniques that
address the distribution of power in society
9,10 and patterns of
formal and informal relationships that shape policy agendas,
11
in which policy entrepreneurs invest resources to bring about
policies they desire, while other stakeholders, who remain
uninvolved, cede influence.
12
A stakeholder is any person or organization that has an
interest and the potential to influence an organization, policy
or project.
13 Stakeholder analysis seeks to understand their
interests in the issue, the positions they take on particular
policies and the strength with which they hold them and
their real and potential influence, which means that it is
possible to understand who is supportive, opposed, neither
supportive or opposed and marginal.
Snowball sampling was used, beginning with obvious stake-
holders
14 and information was obtained from semi-structured
interviews. Those interviewed were asked to suggest others that
might be stakeholders and this process continued until no new
subjects were identified.
The analysis explored attitudes to a range of standard
alcohol policy options, including taxation, availability, mini-
mum ages, regulations on production and sale of non-beverage
alcohol, advertisement and promotion and enforcement of
drink-driving legislation. Stakeholders were asked to reflect
on their potential to influence policy and their relationships
with other stakeholders.
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(AG), informed by ongoing research on alcohol in Russia,
taking contemporaneous notes supplemented by observations
immediately afterwards. Findings were discussed subsequently
with other team members. Informed consent was obtained
with the assurance that comments would not be attributed
to individuals.
The potential of interviewees to influence alcohol policy was
assessed according to their willingness to engage in policy dis-
cussions within the scope of their normal activities, their
ability to be heard in those discussions and their ability to
influence other relevant actors. We particularly sought
evidence of where they had made an impact on previous
policies. Our judgement of the strength of each stakeholder
and the interrelations among them represents a synthesis
of their own perceptions and how others perceive them.
We differentiated personal views of individuals from those of
their organizations.
We then constructed an influence map. This is a series of
concentric ellipses in which those with the greatest influence
on policy are in the centre, with entities having less influence
on the periphery. Linkages between different entities are rep-
resented by lines, the thickness of which reflects the intensity of
the relationship, with the legend describing the nature of these
relationships and influences.
We were not able to interview a representative of
Roszdravnadzor, but included this organization in the
influence map based on our knowledge of its role in alcohol
policy and on information provided by other stakeholders with
which it interacts.
Results
We report the views of organizations with a presence in the
oblast, although we also took account of stated policies and
positions of federal and international entities where relevant.
Twenty-nine stakeholder organizations were identified
(table 1), from which 43 representatives agreed to be inter-
viewed. Subjects were mostly the most senior person in the
organization but, in a few cases, they nominated deputies.
We were unable to secure access to the producers and distribu-
tors of non-beverage alcohol.
Positions of stakeholders on measures to reduce
alcohol-related problems and the strength with which they
hold them are shown in table 2. Although almost all
indicated either support for or opposition to more effective
action, few articulated strong views. The exceptions were some
federal agencies, who supported stronger action, and some
producers who opposed it.
How the issues are viewed
All major stakeholders acknowledged alcohol as posing a
serious problem. Oblast and municipal officials stressed the
importance of effective action and the need for a broad
range of policy measures. However, each saw the problem
Table 1 Organizations included in the study
Stakeholder Who was interviewed Abbreviation
Municipal Department of Social Protection Senior executive DepSocProt
Municipal Department of Family Planning Senior executive DepFamPl
Municipal Department of Education Senior executive DepEduc
Municipal youth crisis centre Senior executive YouthCrCntr
Municipal women’s crisis centre Senior executive WomCrCntr
Labor Committee of the Oblast Government Senior executive LaborCom
Oblast Ministry of Internal Affairs Senior executive MoIntAf
Gosnarkokontrol of RF in region Senior professional Gosnarko-kontrol
Oblast Ministry of Health Deputy minister OblMoHlth
City State Medical Academy Senior academic MedAcad
City Municipal Ambulance and Emergency Service Senior physician AmbEmer
Oblast Narcological Dispensary Senior physician NarcoDisp
Oblast Psychiatric Dispensary Senior physician PsychiDisp
Health services specialists and researchers Two heads of clinical departments,
two health researchers
Spe/Res
Oblast Pharmaceutical Committee Senior executive PhCom
Pharmaceutical retailers (large chains of pharmacies
and individual pharmacies)
Two heads of branches and three retailers PhRetail
Federal Department on Consumer Rights and
Health Protection (Rospotrebnadzor, Oblast branch)
Senior physician Rospotrebnadzor
City branch of WHO project ‘Healthy Cities’ Senior executive WHO/HealthCity
Municipal Program ‘Healthy Schools’ Senior manager HlthSch
Local spirits-and-liquor producing enterprises Directors in both enterprises in the region StronAlcPr
Oblast-based beer producers Director and deputy director in 2 of 3
enterprises in the region
OblBeerPr
National and transnational beer producers Published material TransBeerPr
Retailers and owners of kiosks and shops Two shop owners, one shop worker and
three kiosk owners
Retailers/kiosks
Industrial enterprises and factories Director of a major industrial enterprise, two
deputy directors of smaller factories
Industry
Community Organization of Youth Two senior managers YthOrg
Russian Orthodox Church Senior cleric RuOrthCh
Ethnic Society Senior manager EthSoc
Municipal government Senior manager (social affairs) MunGov
Oblast Government Senior politician OblGov
Federal government Published material FedGov
To preserve confidentiality, we report the level at which each individual operated in the organization but not their actual
position.
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Internal Affairs stressed the problem of counterfeit alcohols,
especially illegal vodka imported mainly from the northern
Caucasus and which the Ministry estimated comprised at
least 40% of all sales. In contrast, the Health Ministry
stressed the adverse health consequences among working-
age men, while other health sector organizations stressed
on the problem drinking among adolescents and children as
young as seven, and the importance of non-beverage alcohols
and illegally produced spirits. The education sector also
focused on problem drinking by young people but saw a
lack of recreational facilities, high level of social disadvantage
and parental drinking as key factors. Rospotrebnadzor, the
trading standards organization, expressed concern about
poisoning by non-beverage and illegal alcohols.
Local spirits and beer producers saw the problem concen-
trated among adolescents, with a lower age of initiation of
drinking. They were especially concerned about non-beverage
alcohols, illegally produced spirits and alco-pops, all of which
they perceived as competition.
Manufacturing industry was concerned about drinking in
the workforce, a view echoed by the Oblast Labour Committee.
Views from the pharmaceutical sector were contradictory:
the representative body acknowledged the easy availability of
beverage alcohols but denied being a major provider of cheap
alcohol in medicinal tinctures, while individual pharmacists
conceded that this was the case.
Other stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations
and the church had less specific concerns.
Favoured policy responses
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Rospotrebnadzor had only
a general perception that it would be good to reduce alcohol
poisonings, drunk driving and alcohol-associated crime.
Where Rospotrebnadzor had acted ostensibly on health
grounds, for example, by banning import and retail certifica-
tion of Georgian and Moldovian wines, this was viewed as
reflecting Russian foreign policy imperatives.
Producers of local spirits argued that child and adolescent
drinking should be addressed first, as this laid a basis for later
problem drinking. They accepted that as producers they had a
responsibility for preventing underage drinking, but conceded
that they were doing little about it. In contrast, they stressed
that adult drinking is a personal choice. They expressed
support for measures that might further reduce the availability
of illegal and non-beverage alcohols as well as the prevention
of alcohol abuse among their own workforce. They were
opposed to federal moves to increase excise taxes, not least
because they were sceptical about their scope to compensate
for lost revenues by increasing prices, as they believed that high
taxes would reduce their market share with people turning
instead to illegal and bootleg alcohols.
Beer producers took a similar attitude, but supported any
policy that they felt would increase consumption of their
products. They had welcomed the crisis that beset the
alcohol market following the 2006 legislation, which created
a transient shortage of spirits. Like the spirits manufacturers,
they would also support stricter measures against illegal and
non-beverage products, beginning with the imposition of
excise taxes on strong alcohol beverages and medicinal
tinctures, ultimately moving to a total ban on sales of
medicinal tinctures.
Oblast authorities faced a conflict because of the substantial
contribution of alcohol industry to oblast tax revenues.
In addition, they perceived the scope of any effective policy
initiative to be beyond their remit, because the legal framework
within which they work is determined largely at the federal
Table 2 The nature and strength of positions of key actors on a policy to reduce incidence of alcohol-related
problems
Position Strength
Municipal Department of Social Protection Support Low
Municipal Department of Family Planning Support Low
Municipal Department of Education Support Low
Municipal youth crisis centre Support Low
Municipal women’s crisis centre Support Low
Labor Committee of the Oblast Government Support Low
Oblast Ministry of Internal Affairs Support Low
Gosnarkokontrol of RF in region Non-mobilized Low
Oblast Ministry of Health Support Low
City State Medical Academy Support Low
City Municipal Ambulance and Emergency Service Support Low
Oblast Narcological Dispensary Support Low
Oblast Psychiatric Dispensary Support Low
Health services specialists and researchers Support Low
Oblast Pharmaceutical Committee Non-mobilized Low
Pharmaceutical retailers (large chains of pharmacies
and individual pharmacies)
Non-mobilized Low
Federal Department on Consumer Rights and Health
Protection (Rospotrebnadzor, Oblast branch)
Support Low-medium
City branch of WHO project ‘Healthy Cities’ Support Low
Municipal Program ‘Healthy Schools’ Support Low
Local spirits-and-liquor producing enterprises Non-mobilized-opposition Medium-high
Oblast-based beer producers Non-mobilized-opposition Low
National and transnational beer producers Opposition Medium-high
Retailers and owners of kiosks and shops Opposition Low
Industrial enterprises and manufactories Support Low
Community Organization of Youth Support Low
Russian Orthodox Church Support Low
Ethnic Society Support Low
Municipal government Support Medium
Oblast Government Support Medium
Federal government Support Medium-high
590 European Journal of Public Healthlevel. There was only a partial recognition that they could do
more to enforce existing regulations.
All health-sector organizations accepted their responsibility
for tackling problem drinking, but saw their role mainly as
maintaining adequate treatment services for people with
alcohol problems. The highly specialized narcological and
psychiatric dispensaries are supported by a network of
physician-narcologists and psychiatrists in some policlinics
and hospitals, These are seen by the rest of the health sector
as natural leaders on alcohol issue. They supported a total ban
on production of medicinal tinctures, but saw scope for pre-
scription of ethanol containing medicines under medical
supervision. So far they had concentrated on provision of
treatment but they did concede that they could play a role in
shaping policy by drawing attention to the magnitude of the
problem and taking advantage of the popular perception that
they were experts.
The education sector, organized at the municipal level, saw
health promotion as a high priority, and especially prevention
of alcohol abuse among adolescents. It also supported stricter
controls on sale of alcohols to underage youth, beginning
with increasing the minimum age for sales to 21 years,
extending to making sale of alcohol to underage drinkers a
criminal offence.
The pharmaceutical sector, and particularly the large
pharmaceutical chains, saw their responsibility as complying
with the 2006 legislation but, as with the alcohol industry,
there were differing views. The large and medium chains
expressed concern about their reputation and sought to
position themselves in the more affluent sector of the
market. They argued that their larger scale of operation
posed greater risks, compared to independent pharmacies,
should they be found to violate 2006 regulations, which
prevent sales of tinctures in bottles larger than 25ml. This
was borne out by our earlier research that found the regula-
tions flouted more often in independent pharmacies.
7 There
was recognition that independent pharmacists obtained a sub-
stantial share of total profits from these tinctures, especially
because they found it difficult to compete with the lower
wholesale prices of drugs obtained by large chains (most
people pay directly for drugs prescribed outside hospital).
Unsurprisingly, large pharmaceutical retailers supported
restrictions on sales of tinctures, although they did not see it
as a high priority. In contrast, while independent pharmacists
accepted that there was a problem, they were unenthusiastic
about measures that would impact on sales and indicated that
they would continue to sell such products ‘under-the-table’
unless there was very rigorous enforcement.
Alcohol retailers, including owners of street kiosks, saw their
responsibility as following regulations banning sale of alcohols
to underage youth. However, they acknowledged that alcohol
revenues accounted for much of their total income.
Industrial employers were interested in broader measures
that would reduce problem drinking in the workforce.
However, they had a narrow perspective: alcohol consumption
at work was no longer tolerated, and was a common reason for
dismissal. In contrast, problem drinking outside work hours
was generally tolerated and measures to support problem
drinkers were weak or non-existent.
Other sectors, such as community, ethnic and religious
organizations, supported a wide range of restrictions on
alcohol as well as increased rehabilitation and community
support services, although these are of unknown effectiveness.
Influence on policy
Only two groups could be considered to exert a significant
impact on policy. These were some producers and the
federal government bodies. Producers of local spirits exerted
influence by virtue of their contribution to taxes: in 2007, they
contributed 1.7 billion roubles (E47 million) in excise duties,
placing the region among top 10 Russian oblasts in terms of
alcohol tax recovery. Obviously, opposition to measures that
would reduce alcohols consumption was strongest among
them. In pursuing their agenda of minimizing excise taxes
they stressed the message that adverse health effects of
drinking were largely attributable to ‘low-quality’ illegal and
bootleg vodka, implying a necessity to ensure a supply of cheap
legal spirits. The manufacturers of spirits also strongly opposed
any local restrictions, reporting that, in 2007, 64% of their
output was sold in the Oblast.
Beer producers were divided. National and transnational
beer producers were increasingly influential, using their
resources to secure support in oblast and municipal
authorities. Strategies included creation of new production
facilities and expensive advertising campaigns backed by
sophisticated market research beyond the scope of local
producers, reduced prices to gain market share and
subsidized delivery to retailers. Transnational beer producers
also exert influence at the federal level, supporting tax increases
on low and medium alcohol products, such as alco-pops and
wines, as in 2007 (62%). In contrast, local producers perceived
themselves as having little influence on oblast authorities that
they viewed as indifferent to their plight. They perceived
themselves as a ‘milk cow’ providing substantial revenues but
getting little in return. Several local producers had recently
ceased trading, while the remainder had scaled back
investment in manufacturing capacity. Those that survived
had seen a marked decline in sales.
The influence of the federal government lay in its legislative
power, illustrated by the enactment of the 2006 legislation.
Partly as a consequence of the decentralized nature of
government in the Russian Federation, federal ministries
were seen as having little influence.
15 However, with the estab-
lishment of a federal body to regulate the alcohol industry
‘Gosalcocontrol’, the federal government is becoming more
influential. Many experts see this as creating greater oppor-
tunities for lobbying by the largest producers.
In contrast to the clear opposition by the alcohol industry to
policies to reduce drinking, most other stakeholders that might
be supportive had so far paid little attention to the issue, or
adopted a very narrow perspective.
Rospotrebnadzor, the trading standards organization, was
active in targeting contaminated spirits, while ignoring the
vast majority of non-beverage alcohols that contain pure
ethanol.
Oblast and municipal-level authorities took a very limited
view of what could be done. They acknowledged little oppor-
tunity to influence federal alcohol policy and did little within
their own areas of responsibility, such as their power to restrict
hours when alcohol can be sold. Among oblast ministries,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs was seen as among the most
powerful, but it limited its activities to tackling production and
sale of illegally produced alcohols (both home distilled and
diverted from industrial production).
The oblast Health Ministry, although often stating the
importance of tackling the health consequences of alcohol
abuse, had little influence on policy. None of the health-sector
organizations was especially influential on broader alcohol
policy, reflecting their narrow focus on treatment.
The education sector had been able to implement a few
initiatives, such as health-promotion programmes targeting
high school students and their families, taking advantage of
links with the World Health Organization (WHO) ‘Healthy
Cities’ and ‘Healthy schools’ programmes. Twelve of approxi-
mately 100 high schools in the oblast capital employed
Russian alcohol policy 591psychologists and ‘social teachers’ who worked with students
exhibiting problem behaviour. These students often came from
families where one or both parents are problem drinkers. The
education authorities sought to create healthy and supportive
environments for children that will protect them from the
influence of aggressive alcohol and tobacco promotion
campaigns. Overall, the educational sector understood the
scale and nature of the problem, and was motivated to
respond, but felt that it had little influence on alcohol policy
beyond its immediate sphere of action.
The pharmaceutical sector was generally indifferent to the
problems associated with alcohol, with little to say in policy
debates and failing to perceive any opportunities to exert
influence.
Alcohol retailers, including those owning small kiosks
and outlets, were fragmented and lacked influence, except
through informal links with those seeking to tackle illegal
sale of beverages to youth and non-beverage alcohols.
Other organizations representing religious and community
groups acknowledged little influence on policy.
Synthesis
The findings from this study are represented in an influence
map (figure 1), which examines linkages between various
stakeholders. This shows central role of the Federal and
oblast municipal governments, as well as Rospotrebnadzor,
the trading standards organization and transnational beer
companies and spirits producers. It shows how government
and alcohol industry are linked through a strong set of
formal and informal connections. In contrast, many of the
organizations that, in a Western context, might be expected
Intensive 
Moderate 
Weak 
1 Contribution to budgets, pro-alcohol lobby, opposition to 
local and federal anti-alcohol initiatives, securing support 
formally and informally 
9 Legislation on denaturing non-beverage alcohols, 
establishment of state standards for quality of spirit 
containing products 
2 Price and marketing competition, capturing regional 
markets 
10  Quality control of beverage alcohols 
3 Municipal and regional health promotion initiatives  11  Quality control of medicinal tinctures, ban on sale of 
tinctures with volume of bottle >25 ml 
4 Maintaining medicalized health services for treatment of 
people with alcohol problems 
12  Formal and informal evasion from ban on sale of tinctures 
with volume >25 ml
5 Excise taxation, alcohol legislation, demographic and 
public health policies 
13  Quality control of non-medicinal non-beverage spirit 
containing products 
6 Demographic and public health policies, national project 
‘Health’ 
14  Registration of medicines allowed for sale in the oblast, 
including registration of spirit containing medicinal 
tinctures 
7 Legislation on quality control of spirits, foreign policy (ex. 
ban on import of Georgian and Moldovian wines due to 
their ‘bad’ quality) 
15 
16 
8 Establishment of time limits for sale of alcohol beverages 
Controlling falsified, counterfeit and surrogate alcohols  
Controlling falsified, counterfeit and illegal spirit 
containing medicinal tinctures 
Figure 1 Influence map
592 European Journal of Public Healthto engage in a multi-sectoral response to problem drinking, are
somewhat peripheral, disengaged and with few or weak inter-
connections, either to the more influential stakeholders or to
each other.
Discussion
A number of caveats are necessary to interpret our findings.
The study was limited to a single oblast of Russia, so we cannot
know whether views elicited would be the same elsewhere.
We must also recognize the possibility that interviewees may
seek to mislead about their true views. However, the interviews
were designed to detect inconsistencies and those interviewed
appeared to be willing to speak frankly and their views were
entirely consistent with their roles and incentives. This may be
because we did not record the interviews on tape. Our pilot
work showed this would inhibit discussion. We also described
the situation at a single point in time, although stakeholders’
views can change. Finally, we were unable to interview some
stakeholders, such as producers and distributors of non-
beverage and illegal alcohols, and we did not interview stake-
holders operating at the federal level.
Our findings are consistent with theory underpinning stake-
holder analysis. There were a number of policy entrepreneurs
(in this case producers) who were willing to invest their efforts
in bringing about their desired policy future.
12 We also
identified the existence of both administrative networks
(linking agencies engaged with the issue) and interest group
networks (such as those involving producers and government
as, respectively, generators and recipients of revenues).
16
There were two striking findings. The first was that many
organizations that we might expect to play a role in alcohol
policy were almost entirely disengaged: while almost everyone
recognized that there was a problem (even if they disagreed
about its nature) they believed that they could do nothing
about it. We did, however, elicit considerable interest when
explaining the issue to interviewees and describing policies
adopted elsewhere. The second was that those who might
favour restrictions on alcohol were highly fragmented. There
was no evidence of a multi-sectoral coalition for health.
However, this fragmentation was also seen among those
opposed to effective action.
As expected, not everyone was in favour of reduced con-
sumption. Producers of beer and spirits as well as small
retailers all seek to at least maintain consumption of their
products. Some, especially the smaller ones, have little
influence, but the market is changing with entry by larger
companies with expertise in marketing and distribution.
Their messages are often sophisticated, such as the apparent
promotion of responsible drinking by international beer
companies, even though the messages are ambiguous, with
many people interpreting them as encouraging both drinking
and positive images of producer.
17,18 These techniques,
coupled with massive investment in production and distribu-
tion facilities, have contributed to a dramatic increase in beer
consumption in Russia, from 15l per capita in 1996 to more
than 60l in 2007. Yet, official production of spirits remains
undiminished, exceeding levels in 1990 and comprising 70% of
all legally produced alcohol. Thus, increased beer consumption
seems to be supplementing rather than substituting for spirits
consumption.
We observed a widespread view that little can be done at the
oblast level. Yet, other regions have refuted this. Some have
restricted the times at which alcoholic beverages can be sold
(e.g. Pskov and Chelyabinsk), while Belgorod has banned the
sale of alcohol containing medicinal tinctures without a pre-
scription. Other non-legislative measures observed include in-
formation campaigns, non-medicalized counselling and
treatment services as well as enforcement of drink-driving
restrictions.
Although ministries and regulatory agencies recognize that
there is a problem, they are either conflicted, because of the
revenue provided by the alcohol industry, or feel that it is not
their responsibility. In part, their unwillingness to assume
responsibility reflects a belief that it is up to federal bodies
to act. Paradoxically, this may have been encouraged by the
federal authorities’ restriction of production and sale of
surrogates. A second factor is the lack of inter-sectoral
working to promote health. This leaves the increasingly vocal
alcohol producers in a strong position to block any potential
restrictions on their activities.
These findings do, however, provide some grounds for
optimism. First, there is almost complete consensus that
robust action is required to tackle the problem of non-
beverage alcohols, except among independent pharmacists.
Second, there are organizations that share concerns about the
scale of alcohol-related problems facing Russian society.
Although most feel it is not their business to become involved
and few know what might be effective, they could be mobilized
to create a coalition that would work across sectors.
There are some things that could be done at once. The
debate about loss of revenues was clearly being conducted
without awareness of the growing evidence, indicating that
alcohol has a substantial economic cost through its impact
on the health service, lost productivity and law enforcement,
although this evidence has been assembled for Russia.
19,20
Second, information on scale of the problem, whereby
hazardous drinking now accounts for almost 50% of deaths
among working-age men in Russia, as well as the lessons learnt
from policy innovations in other oblasts, should be provided
to those organizations that have expressed concern, but are
unsure what to do.
Following the completion of these interviews, certain federal
policy measures were enacted. In May 2009, the Public
Chamber of the Russian Federation proposed a comprehensive
range of measures designed to reduce harmful effects of
alcohol.
21 The proposed measures address all sources of
alcohol and draw on evidence-based policies used elsewhere.
Whether these recommendations will be acted upon remains
to be seen. However, our findings highlight the challenges that
any federal initiative will have to overcome if it is to be
implemented and reinforced effectively at the local level.
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Key points
 In a typical Russian region, organizations that might
be expected to play a role in developing or implement-
ing alcohol policy are almost entirely disengaged and
highly fragmented.
 There was no evidence of multi-sectoral collaboration
to promote health, leaving alcohol producers free to
block any restrictions on their activities.
 There is a need to communicate the fact that effective
action to reduce alcohol consumption is possible in
Russia.
 Implementation of effective alcohol policy at the
regional level in Russia is challenging, given the
existence of a powerful pro-alcohol lobby opposed to
any initiatives to reduce alcohol consumption.
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